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Abstract.  This paper may be one of the first attempts dealing with the problem of creating, 
providing and maintaining antifragility of systems of interdependent urban critical 
infrastructures (CI) in the wake of black-swan type technological, ecological, economic or 
social catastrophes occurring in a municipality. A synonym is offered to describe antifragility 
from a positive psychology perspective, formulating the problem as the supraresilience 
problem. A brief description is given of the developed innovative approach for creating a 
supraresilient city/region using black-swan catastrophe and the antifragility concepts. 
Resilience metrics are formulated as well as methods of assessing damage, interdependence of 
infrastructures and convergent technologies and sciences needed for practical  regional 
resilience and risk management of the system of systems (SoS) of interdependent urban critical 
infrastructures).  
1.  Introduction 
The black swan and antifragility concepts and their mostly phenomenological theories and empirics  
introduced to the broad public by Nassim Nicolas Taleb (N.N.T.) [1,2] are based on in-depth and 
convincing analysis of modern finances and macroeconomics, seamlessly coupled with the wisdom of 
a plethora of Ancient and modern philosophers and leavened by anecdotal and apocryphal cases, 
mostly from the Levant, Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome  and other  Near Mediterranean countries. 
These concepts are based on three whales: (1) profound nonlinearity of mysterious unknown 
random processes of time and financial transactions that rule the financial world of NYSE, NASDAQ 
and the like; (2) extremely rare events that now and then shock World macroeconomics, create and 
bring super expensive chaos into lives of millions if not billions of people; (3) ability to see and use 
the intrinsic asymmetry of the optionality principle to one’s (non-sucker, in NNT’s parlance) benefit. 
However, their generalization onto other sectors of human activity, science and engineering 
(practically, to all walks of life, as energetically offered by N.N. Taleb in [2]), need some serious 
bricolage (adjusting, calibration, tinkering), for we all know: the devil is in the details. For potential 
users considered in this paper (urban decision makers DMs), without specific tinkering this approach 
may turn out to be counterproductive or an overkill.  
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2.  The Black Swan catastrophe (BSC) concept 
According to N.N. Taleb, the black swan catastrophe  (BSC) is an event  with following attributes: (1) 
it lies outside the realm of regular expectations (is a huge surprise not only to broad public, but also to 
the very specialists who designed the system in consideration; in our case, any urban critical 
infrastructure);  (2) it results in (relatively) massive, catastrophic losses; (3) despite being an  outlier, 
risk analysis specialists every time explain the next BSC occurrence post factum, making it look as an 
explainable and predictable event (although actually, it is unpredictable).Originally this kind of 
unpredictability was attributed by N. Taleb exclusively to macroeconomic and financial events. Later, 
this concept was applied with mixed results by other authors to some other sectors of technology and 
sciences [3,4]. 
It should be noted that the BSC as an event is scalable and is intrinsically conditional. One could 
imagine a BSC of global dimension (say, the unexpected and unpredictable Krakatau earthquake, 
Indonesia, 1897; global financial catastrophes of 1929 or 2008), as well as regional, local and down to 
personal scale BSC, when a stakeholder or pensioner loses her savings/assets in a surprise (for her) 
bankruptcy of a company. These conditions could be unknown to (1) the world scientific community; 
(2) a group of people who were affected by the BSC; (3) a single person due to lack of needed 
knowledge and/or false perception of the BSC before it happened. 
Taleb further gives a classification of the super-rare events: he recognizes black-, grey- and white-
swan (benibn rare) events, claiming that he deals only with black swans in macroeconomics and 
finance.  In this context we will consider two types of BS events: in economics, which we will denote 
as BSEe, and in Mother Nature or second, man-made Nature, which will be denoted as BSEph. 
The grey-swan events in the field of economics were taken care of by the famous mathematician, 
Benoit Mandelbrot, when he introduced his fractal theory [5] and showed that many events 
(distribution of wealth, revenue from selling books of different authors, etc.) obey not the exponent-
based Gaussian probability distribution function (PDF), but the more complex power PDFs with so-
called fat tails. N.Taleb remarked [1] that due to B. Mandelbrot, who was first to use a more accurate 
and consistent in macroeconomics  PDF (namely, the Pareto PDF, that possesses a fat [or heavy] tail), 
to describe BSEe, the latter were transformed into grey  swan events,  as they started to be to some 
extent more predictable. Here it would be appropriate  to recollect the famous adage: The tail wags the 
dog. 
The white black-swan events are benign, because they produce (very rarely) great benefits, not 
losses. 
Engineers and scientists from the oil and gas industry produced [4,6,7] their own classification of 
black- swan type events. They recognize following industrial BSEph: (1) completely unknown to the 
scientific/engineering community (unknown unknowns up to the moment of their occurrence); (2) 
unknown to the specific /local  scientific/engineering community, but known if considered worldwide 
(unknown knowns – unknown events to some (suckers), known to others (non-suckers)); (3) well 
known, but considered extremely unlikely to happen during the entire lifetime or  the timeframe 
between consecutive inspections or maintenance of the designed structure/system (say, a main pipeline 
or a sea-shelf platform). The tsunami that destroyed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station is a 
typical example: in that region of Japan there were previously observed (in the 6-th and 13-th century) 
more severe tsunami, but the probability of them reoccurring was so minuscule (once in a million 
years), that it was deliberately ignored. If the unfortunate nuclear power plant had been built just 
several meters higher above ground, or had a levee built around it, the critical pumps wouldn’t been 
flooded and there would be no Fukushima catastrophe, and no belated surprise that it happened. 
Other BSCph are of the perfect-storm type (when all the components of such an event are well 
understood, but the probability of them emerging simultaneously, creating a negative synergy effect is 
so miniscule that it is deliberately ignored [8]), like the  Guadalajara hail storm (in July 2019) when 
some parts of this city, according to the Washington Post, were covered by a five feet high layer of 
hail; or the 2019 flooding of New Orleans when a storm wave, wind-induced wave and the Mississippi 
flow created a synergistically combined wall of water that drowned the city.  
SPCECI 2019










There are attempts to make more reliable predictions of industrial and natural catastrophes using 
some combinations of brainstorming and computer modeling [9–13]. The forecasters now claim that 
some weak signals could serve as early heralds or precursors of BSEph, although the time to it will still 
be an unknown. Some clues from global warming, cosmic events or animal behavior can be 
effectively used for this matter. 
In physics and engineering sciences statistical analysis of rare events is performed, using such 
PDFs, as Freshet, Gumbel, and Weibull, to name a few. Using the Bayes methodology these PDFs can 
be continuously updated after each occurrence of a rare event. This permits meaningful assessment of 
probabilities of stronger accidents and catastrophes in the above-mentioned fields 
BS events that take place in modern physics, industry and all types of engineering (BSEph) do not 
have the devastating effect that is demonstrated by BS events in macroeconomics and finances (BSEe). 
The reason for this is that the forces that play out during an industrial disaster are limited by location, 
physical laws, size of the installation, and the reached level of sophistication of the technology in 
containing energy, the only exclusion being nuclear energy and nuclear war. Natural catastrophes can 
be more violent than any human folly, but they also erupt locally, are contained by the size of planet’s 
continents/oceans and laws of mechanics and physics. Damages from BSEph always have natural 
physical limits that could be reasonably assessed. Even in a potential Armageddon-type catastrophe 
involving the whole Universe we have a number, called googol, that cannot be exceeded. Bottom line: 
All engineering accidents are much less grey than Mandelbrot’s grey-swan catastrophes. 
Some BSEe that happen in finances and macroeconomics, on the contrary, deliver a global blow to 
virtually every country, alongside with millions of stockholders. BSEe are not contained by the actual 
combined cost of the world’s physical and intellectual assets. The combined value of stocks (financial 
instruments) traded on all the major stock exchanges (in New York, London, Tokyo, Berlin, Shanghai, 
Moscow, etc.) is several times larger than the combined value of the physical assets that they 
represent. The BSEe defy prediction explicitly because despite availability and accessibility of all the 
enormous amount of financial and economic data, generated every second, statistically it is not 
homogeneous. It consists of “real” data (reflects the physical assets, and “virtual” data (reflects the 
speculative component and human perception of what the stock may be priced in the future), without 
any means to parse it into real and virtual. That parsing the data into homogeneous sets is impossible 
is reflected in the famous mantra: «All costs are already accounted for in the current price of stock».  
There are, obviously, many other reasons for the financial market to be a classical black box, but their 
consideration is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Modern economic and technical systems as they become more complex and interdependent are 
becoming more vulnerable in respect to accidents and catastrophes.  The consequences of industrial 
catastrophes continuously grow with time due to the negative synergy of damaging effects 
(leak/rupture + fire + blast + destruction of assets + pollution of air/soil/water + loss of life-days, limbs 
and life + loss of revenue, trust, reputation and prestige). Many BSEph became transboundary, 
international. Industrial and natural catastrophes are becoming a serious destabilizing factor that 
prevents sustainable development of cities, regions and countries.  
The rate of occurrence of industrial accidents is still high despite all the efforts to pull it down. 
According to [14] in 90%  of automobile accidents the culprit is the driver(s); in aviation and river 
transportation up to 83% of catastrophes have human factor HF as the root cause; the same holds true 
in the energy field – 80% of industrial accidents are due to mistakes of the field personnel; in sea 
catastrophes 75% of them are related to human mistakes and mishaps; in railway transportation the 
corresponding number is 50%. According to [15], the HF in technogenic catastrophes frequently 
comes down to such human traits as stupidity, neglect or greed.  All in all, it can be stated that the 
weakest link in the industrial safety problem is the human factor. Similar numbers apply to accidents 
in interdependent urban critical infrastructures. Hence, in order to drive down the probability of BSEph 
we should turn our attention to the role of HF in their occurrence.  
What can be put against this tendency? Foremost, teaching safety culture to all employees of all 
ranks. And creating an atmosphere that stimulates active search of vulnerable points of the 
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infrastructure being maintained.  In this context, the popular motto in the 1980s of a giant American 
corporation: To err is human. To forgive is not company policy, spread worldwide (author came across 
it while lecturing at Milan Politec) as a cartoon in which a designer standing in front of a drawing 
board is beaten with a stick from behind, today would not be well received by employees or by the 
broad public. Instead of punishing, a tolerant climate is needed, where everybody freely 
communicates, and upper echelon of listens to the lower. Forming safety culture is the universal tool 
for not allowing wrong actions of personnel that lead to mishaps and accidents.  
Industrial catastrophes are developing in a continuously deteriorating man-made environment. The 
health of deteriorating structures and machines is periodically or continuously diagnosed and 
monitored, providing operators and owners of the assets with robust data using which sound 
assessment of their residual life can be obtained. This permits controlling the operated system in time, 
using risk based predictive maintenance methods.  
3.  The fragility-antifragility concept 
N.N. Taleb justly and correctly describes the fragility-antifragility concept as a specific current 
property of any object, tacitly indicating that antifragility is an explicit function of time. Fragility is a 
well-known property in structural mechanics, that defines low ability of an object to resist external 
and/or internal harmful factors.  In English language there exists a near-synonym of this word: 
brittleness, that has a more negative connotation than fragility (e.g., brittle diabetic, but a mentally 
fragile old relative). Its antonym is ductility or viscosity. Some strong viscous metals like steel alloys 
and structures made from them become brittle when exposed to very low temperatures (below minus 
50 degrees Celsius). This phenomenon brings to life the urgent design problem of creating cold-
climate-resistant pipelines, transportation and ground moving machinery for the Far North, Arctic and 
Antarctica regions.  
In Russian language the word resilience – живучесть – refers both to live and dead (non-
animated) objects and means that a system is able not only to rebound after being released from a 
stressor, but also continue to exist  (stay alive/operate) when being injured/damaged and perform its 
functions under stressor or duress as designed by humans or God. According to the Ozhegov Russian 
dictionary живучесть describes the ability of a system (say, a battleship), to stay afloat and continue 
to fire, using its remaining internal strengths, while having its scull damaged by adversary’s artillery. 
In this context the word непотопляемый (unsinkable) is also used in relation to boats and humans 
alike. A perfect visualization of this notion can be seen in a Russian doll called ванька-встанька 
which means the stand-up vanya, or неваляшка which can be translated as roly-poly (Fig. 1). Being 
forced into a horizontal position and then released, it immediately pops up back into vertical position. 
Hence the name of the doll.  
 
 














Antifragility, on the contrary, did not exist as a notion before Nicholas Taleb introduced it in 2012 
as an antonym to fragility and demonstrates itself as the ability of a system to become stronger (up to 
an unknown point) after experiencing a stressor. If the stressor exceeds this unknown level (which 
itself is a random function of time), the person instead of accruing antifragility may become seriously 
harmed and loses his initial capabilities. Hence, antifragility is principally more than resilience or 
robustness. Taleb uses this connotation (antifragility) only in relation to live or complex objects –
human beings and the Mother Nature (biological and ecological systems). He also admits that complex 
systems can be antifragile, obviously meaning, by default, that their complexity must include the 
human dimension. Antifragility is a trait that exclusively exists in living objects, because mind-/spirit-
less (dead) objects have no ability to proactively react to different stressors of economic, financial or 
emotional, as well as of physical nature so as to become more resilient/strong than before the stressors 
were applied. Creative human action is essentially needed to achieve that part of antifragility that is 
beyond resilience of non-animated objects as we know it. 
All objects created by human beings cannot become stronger after being treated by a vector of 
physical or chemical stressors (loads and/or influences),as they are intrinsically fragile, but this 
statement may soon not be fully true. There is already one case related to a nano-tube carbon 
composite material that became stronger after being physically stressed [16]. An ever-growing 
amount of research is conducted addressing self-healing and resilience of critical infrastructures, 
specifically power and information networks. In the literature that emerged after 2012, the antifragility 
idea as a trendy topic started to be misused, being mechanistically applied to such inert (dead) man-
made systems as architectural design and buildings [3]. In the latter case authors seem to confuse 
moral longevity of buildings and cities (their capability to absorb technical innovations – growing 
automobile and streetcar traffic, elevators, influx of population, etc. without change or becoming 
extinct) – with antifragility. If I buy a pair of Levi’s jeans a couple sizes larger than my current waist 
and then wear them until I feel them tight on me, I cannot claim that these jeans all the time were 
antifragile.  In order to be antifragile they must adjust by themselves, without human intervention, to 
the size of my waist and self-repair, if need be. 
Antifragility comes from and is revealed by mostly yet unknown inner forces of every human or 
biological being (i.e., bear, turtle, sequoia tree, etc.) or their population (i.e., rats, bees, ants or human 
communities) as reaction to different types of stressors.  These forces are triggered by thirst for life,   
freedom, pursuit of happiness,  all kinds of extreme challenges, lust for power, sex, wealth, fear, 
hunger, ultimate anger/fury, obsessive love, vanity, extreme circumstances (e.g., low/high ambient 
temperature or pressure), words of encouragement, patriotism, faith and sense of duty, drugs, and so 
on. In general, it is a manifestation of biological vitality which is, by itself, the force of life. Probably, 
because of this, antifragility was always nameless and word-(expression)less, understood by default by 
humans for millenniums as an intrinsic indelible component of vitality and, hence, never (before 
Taleb) became a separate issue for a philosophical discourse. 
It is not fully known what happens in the body, mind and spirit of an individual when she/he is 
exposed to some specific stressor/ set of stressors. The outcome (positive or negative) of such event 
may come down to overreaction/overshooting. This phenomenon is responsible for preparing a 
biological system to become more powerful in the future in relation to the applied specific stressor 
(load, poison, cold/hot ambient temperature, etc.), when the stressor will be stronger than the 
experienced last time. It may be not a universal type of response of the system to stressors. In some of 
the cases, hidden abilities of humans are revealed immediately, in the face of extreme danger, as in a 
documented case when an Arctic pilot, wearing heavy arctic gear and being attacked by a polar bear, 
saved his life jumping directly from the snow onto the plane’s wing (approximately two meters from 
the snow surface) and getting into his cabin [17].  Schizophrenics during their bouts of wild insanity 
accrue the ability to lift weights (throw heavy oak tables on nurses or lift the back of a taxi car to 
prevent it from moving away), impossible to lift for them when in normal condition. A champion (of 
the Warsaw Zoo) chimpanzee (average weight—60 kg), that does not have human conscience and 
does not fully understand the environment and capabilities of his own body jerks from chest a 650 kg 
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bell bar (nearly 11 times his own weight); on average, a Warsaw Zoo chimpanzee jerks 450 kg [17]. 
Currently the men’s world record in this heavy weight discipline (category up to 56 kg) is only 198 kg 
(3.54 times the record holder’s weight). (This huge difference can be partially explained by that 
chimpanzee’s arm muscles are wired differently from human arms muscles, although they are also 
longer than ours. It seems that this is the price humans pay for having consciousness).  Rats, when 
being decimated by humans, using poison, traps and other lethal means, demonstrate an unusual 
antifragility as a cohort. They start intensive breeding, and new-born rats reach puberty at the tender 
age of two weeks, still being blind [17].  
It should be noted that if the stressor is exceeding some ultimate level, the person exposed to such a 
stressor produces such an overshooting that makes him not stronger, but weaker/sicker, and she/he 
falls into the subset of fragile components of the system, becoming not a system’s asset but its 
burden/liability.  The type of PDF that governs the antifragility skills is a mystery (known unknown), 
but one could speculate that physical antifragility is closer to the Gaussian distribution rather than to 
the Pareto type distribution: genius is always a very rare commodity. The distribution of cognitive 
antifragility skills, though, probably could be better described by the Pareto type PDFs. In any case, 
when creating a smart city, some empirical data on antifragility has to be used as a guidance for 
selecting the city resilience team.  
With the advent of global digitization, AI and robotization, some forecasters predict that by 2060 
AI will match human intelligence [18]. The current level of computer science and AI already permits 
adding some elements of (quasi-) antifragility to cloud computing [19] and creating emotional robots, 
that are able, at least partially, to have a semblance of human emotions (quasi-emotions) and, hence, to 
some extent understand human psyche. It seems that with the advent of time some 21-st century 
robotic systems may be able to maintain and repair themselves to continue to operate «as new» or «as 
before the stressor was applied» (this is resilience in its classical meaning [20]), and if need be, to 
reconstruct themselves to become more smart and durable (for instance, during an unmanned 
expedition on the Moon or Mars), by adding to themselves new modules with new functionalities and 
higher resistance to unforeseen stressors. This would be an act of what could be called resilience plus, 
ultra-resilience, uber resilience or, best, supraresilience (in Taleb’s parlance, antifragility), realized 
by a man-made system without direct human intervention. 
According to Collins English Dictionary the word supra comes from Latin and when used as a 
prefix, means above, over, on top of, greater than, beyond the limits of, outside of. Obviously, it 
perfectly matches the word resilience to describe the result of overshooting/ overcompensating. Hence, 
supraresilience is a positive thinking absolute synonym of antifragility; therefore, both terms are 
interchangeable and from now on will be used as such. In addition, the term supraresilience, in 
general  seems to be more fit for the physical and especially, engineering world, where the term 
resilience is very well established and currently is a hot topic of research. 
In order to achieve the described above feat, the supraresilient robot must be equipped with a smart 
control subsystem that includes diagnostics, monitoring, maintenance, repair modules and a module 
that is able to upgrade the capability of the robot (a self-upgrading module). This subsystem, driven by 
IT and an AI «brain» brings the needed  (quasi-) human dimension into the AI  robot to achieve the 
needed supraresilience/antifragility, as it can, using a two- or three level maintenance/control policy 
[21], mitigate the damage due to a black/gray swan event and raise the robot performance to a  level 
higher than that of the initial design. 
In many branches of modern industry (military, nuclear power, automotive, oil and gas, aviation 
and the like) there are already unmanned robotized and flexible production lines equipped with these 
types of modules. They have in place subsystems that autonomously and automatically carry out 
diagnostics, monitoring and, to some extent, maintenance.  For instance, according to data that can be 
found in the Internet, the performance of the entire fleet of F35 airplanes is tracked by a software 
system that provides holistic life support of each detail and aggregate of every airplane of the fleet. 
The same source forms that the European Airbus company is in the process of equipping all 
airplanes of its fleet with an array of sensors on every aggregate, overhead baggage bin and each 
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passenger chair that generate in real time gigabytes of data related to the airplane performance and the 
feedback of its passengers and flight attendants. This Big Data is streamed to the cloud and the on-
ground servers and immediately analyzed, using the Airbus digital analytical platform Skywise, which 
will also be fed by data from repair shops, spare parts suppliers, airports and airlines. 
Using Skywise, by 2023 each Airbus plane will have its own digital twin. While the 
carbon/titanium airplane will fly, its quasi-identical digital twin will do the same, but in virtual space. 
The discrepancies between the current state of the real airplane and the state of its digital ideal copy 
will be analyzed for detecting early predictors of possible future malfunctions or accidents. This 
platform opens new perspectives in flight safety, flight traffic control and optimization. This 
philosophy is also used by Airbus to create a passenger multicopter (flying taxi) for the city mobility 
project Vahana. 
One doesn't need to be a prophet to predict that all the above achievements will be sooner than later 
emulated and adopted by modern smart cities of all sizes. 
According to N. Taleb, antifragility is implemented by using its main tools: choice and option. 
Freedom of choice permits choosing something that leads to more benefits than losses, while option = 
asymmetry (specific non-linearity) + rationality, could be a substitute of knowledge (in everyday life). 
N. Taleb doesn't describe how to diagnose, measure, and control the antifragility property in humans 
during their lifetime. It is obvious though that in a community or society antifragility is spread 
according to some Weibull type PDF that is a function of time. It also should be specific to each type 
of antifragility (physical, cognitive social). Each person, no matter of what antifragility level, must 
learn how to recognize the options and the asymmetries around her/him and at the workplace and how 
to make sound decisions in the chaotic environment of the 21st century, keeping in mind that there are 
no free lunches. In the areas of physical and engineering environment though, specialists have many 
tools to describe in quantitative terms the options and the asymmetries as well as the tools that help 
making right and sound decisions. At this point we stop further considering this topic as it is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
4.  Resilience of urban critical infrastructures: current concept 
Some 10–15 years ago city managers around the world realized that industrial diagnostics, monitoring 
and maintaining systems could be relatively easily adapted and used to optimally run and maintain all 
city production, transportation and life support facilities. At the beginning, they were slow in 
implementing these ideas but now, with the advent of digitization and AI, have accelerated their 
efforts to transform their cities – large and small – into smart cities. 
In the above context the concept of resilience emerged currently as a central theme of industrial and 
urban development (there are more than 120 definitions of resilience, most of them are 
qualitative)  Sustainable cities of the 21-st century must first be safe, resilient, and, consequently, 
smart in order to then become sustainable. For cities to be safe and smart they have to be resilient in 
the first place [22]. In general, factors that influence city resilience include: the range and severity of 
hazards; the risk to life, limb, health and property; the vulnerability and exposure of human, social, 
and environmental systems to different types of hazards, and the degree of (strategic) preparedness of 
the physical, social and the governance systems to any natural, urban or industrial shocks and stressors 
and their consequences during an incident, accident, malicious act, or catastrophe.  
The architecture of the urban resilience system (URS) [23] mimics the long time existing different 
monitoring and maintenance optimization systems designed to enhance performance of critical 
industrial infrastructures. The difference is in that the urban infrastructure, in its entirety, is a very 
specific complex system of interdependent systems (SoIS), being widely spread over the whole 
territory of a municipality, being 1) intensely used by the city community and 2) elements of its 
transportation infrastructures (cars, trams, buses, metro carriages) continuously move. The URS is 
designed to provide, in the first place, raw and processed data about how this SoIS functions and 
degrades in time. 
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System resilience consists of following components: 1) Structural resilience (reliability, probability 
of failure); 2) Structural safety (risk level, damage zones, all types of losses); 3) Physical restoration 
subsystem for renewing a damaged system. This subsystem can vary by means of recovery (e.g., 
democratic or authoritarian), time and cost of restoration, amount of materiel, financial and human 
resources necessary for restoration; 4) Psychological restoration subsystem for the stressed-out 
society. This subsystem also varies by the amount of psychological assistance and the duration of its 
provision, as well as by the required human, materiel and financial resources. 
 Structural resilience is the ability of a system to maintain its functionality after being stressed by 
loads greater than their design values or after a specific damage. Critical infrastructure has many 
functions; therefore, CI has both complex (integral) and partial resiliencies. Both full and partial 
resiliencies are always conditional. Since the properties of CI and the stressors that it experiences are 
random, the resilience is also random and can be measured as the probability that the CI will retain its 
function(s) under any specific random effect that is beyond the design parameters. The term 
robustness is strongly related to the term resilience, as it means that the system is stable – it gives a 
weak response to a strong disturbance. 
The strategic readiness of a CI is such a state of the system when it remains reliable, relatively safe 
and efficient to perform its main design functions, even with sudden application of extraordinary, way 
out-of-design values of external influences. This can be achieved only by including into the CI a 
deeply echeloned protection subsystem. A case of a one-dimensional stochastic model of failure and 
recovery of infrastructure as a system is shown in Fig. 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. One-dimensional stochastic model of failure and recovery of infrastructure as 
a system: ti – time to incident; tf – time to system failure; tr – time to recovery;  f(i) – PDF 
of the initial triggering event duration; f(d) – PDF of damage volume due to system 
failure; f(r) – PDF of recovery quality. 
 
According to the Rockefeller Foundation: «Urban Resilience is the capacity of individuals, 
communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow, no matter 
what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience, and even transform when conditions 
require it.» 
Resilient systems refer to those institutions, cities or states that have the ability to reconstruct and 
to recover, using the right tools, assets and human social and cognitive skills to deal with impacts and 
resist, absorb and adapt. The challenge here is how to manage these risks effectively, and how to 
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transform a generic resilience concept into a tailored resilience of a specific infrastructure or a 
system.The European Commission defines urban resilience (in general) as «the ability of … a 
community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks 
such as drought, violence, conflict or natural disaster».  
The author's resilience concept adopts a multiple-hazards approach, considering resilience against 
all types of plausible hazards, and refers not only to reducing risks and damages from disasters [i.e. 
loss of lives, limbs, health, elements of Mother Nature (flora & fauna) and assets; i.e., components of 
the second, man-made Nature], but also to the quantified ability to quickly recover to the pre-event 
physical and psychological state after a disaster or catastrophe at as minimal as possible cost.  
To assess the conditional regional resilience (and strategic preparedness) in relation to a 
hypothetical catastrophe or accident that occurred within the ICI system under consideration, it is first 
necessary to identify the region whose infrastructure has been damaged. For instance, to estimate the 
regional resilience in the case of an impact/stressor (hurricane, deliberate actions of intruders, etc.) on 
a large municipality (which includes industrial and civil buildings and structures that produce 
commercial products and life support services for the population living in it), following  initial data is 
needed: 
• GIS with a database (DB) on the topography, population density (number, gender, age, 
profession), locations of damaged critical assets and installations, roads, waterways, etc., and 
how they are interconnected, including information about their owners; 
• Type of threats / stressors under consideration (earthquake, flood, technological disaster, 
resulting in deaths, loss of limb, injuries, pollution of air, water bodies, landscapes, etc.); 
• A stochastic description of the considered regional threat (impact); 
• The design of the infrastructure in question, including types and number of various structures, 
buildings and installations that make up the infrastructure and the type of their 
interdependence (physical, informational) that determine the robustness and innate resilience 
of each structure and the infrastructure as a whole; 
• Statistical characteristics of the physical components of these ICI; 
• The volume and form of available resources for mitigating and eliminating the consequences 
of the disaster (finances, labor, materiel, transport, road-building machines, food, etc.) of the 
region itself and additionally attracted from outside; 
• The socio-demographic description of the society living in the territory occupied by the ICI. 
Having the listed above initial data, it is necessary to: 
• give a description of the primary failure of a system element that initiated the catastrophe per 
se; 
• define the areas affected by the incident (destruction zones) and assess the social risk and 
materiel and human losses from the accident, with accounting for the possible cascade 
development of the catastrophe; 
• define the vulnerability / fragility curves (VC/FC) of each CI that got into destruction zone. 
These FC establish the dependence of the conditional probability of a specified damage of a 
structure on the magnitude of the received impact. Generalized FC are obtained by integrating 
specific FC over the entire areas of possible external influences, and the physical properties of 
the structures and infrastructures’ materials. FC, in combination with the results of the 
analysis of the volume and nature of real damage to structures from one or another type of 
impact (i.e., earthquakes, hurricanes, technological explosions, etc.) allow (via appropriate 
calibration) accurate enough assessment of the number of damaged structures and the level of 
destruction of each individual asset. These problems are solved using statistical dynamics 
methods. 
• Determine the likelihood that the described above region, subjected to a stressor, will recover 
(from the damage level determined at the previous stage) to the level «as it was before the 
accident» within the given directive period of time, using a specific amount of allocated 
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recovery funds. This stage problems are solved using the statistical operations research 
methodology.   
• Evaluate the time and volume of necessary material and non-material means for bringing the 
society back to the previous, pre-emergency level of the psychological state of security and 
well-being, knowing the volume and composition of the destruction of critical infrastructures 
and human losses. 
To solve the above problems following tools are used: 
• The «bottom-up» model of regional economic recovery [22,23]; 
• A full group of events, including all conceivable scenarios with the cascading development of 
a natural or man-made disaster (involving people whose cognition skills include rich 
imagination to construct such scenarios); 
• A rational (quasi-optimal) plan for responding to an accident and rebuilding a damaged 
facility, based on considering an as full as possible set of scenarios, including accidents with 
minimal and maximum consequences. 
The above approach allows minimizing the consequences of an accident by optimizing: the 
distribution of food and water among victims of a disaster; the sequence of repair of electrical 
networks, gas, water, sewage, etc.; localization, retention and collection of oil spills; road cleaning; 
maintenance of shelters; distribution of sandbags for the construction of dams, etc. Direct and inverse 
problems of restoring damaged critical infrastructures of the region also become solvable. The direct 
task gives an assessment of the funds needed to restore the regional infrastructure given the  amount of 
damage and the preset recovery time; the inverse problem determines the necessary time for the 
restoration of regional infrastructure with known volumes of losses and the allocated financial and 
material resources (see [22,23]). These problems are solved iteratively using the Gantt and similar type 
networks. 
All the above allows for the effective management of regional ICI and of the  society related to 
these ICI, at normal times and times of various crises. Decision makers (DMs) at the level of 
municipalities and territories receive an instrument of support and substantiation of their decisions. It 
is no secret that due to lack of time and the lack of flexible tools, many decisions are often taken on a 
hunch, especially when it is necessary to consider the long-term consequences of decisions. Using the 
above approach, DMs will be able to track how taken decisions affect the quality of life and the level 
of satisfaction of their wards / voters.  
A typical development cycle of a single accident of a complex infrastructure in time consists of 
three stages: (1) normal functioning and systematic preparation during its maintenance for the 
prevention of potential disasters ( )00 t t≤ ≤ ; (2) failure of any component that initiates damage to the 
infrastructure and the development (most often, cascade) of a system accident ( )0 1t t t≤ ≤ , and (3) its 
recovery to the pre-emergency state or better than (manifestation of supraresilience /anti-fragility) 
( )1 .et t t≤ ≤  
Each of the stages reflects, respectively, the ability of the system: (1) to resist the force impact 
(manifestation of the congenital structural resilience), (2) to absorb the initial damage (by controlling 
the stressed and deformed state of the system by: duplicating some of its functions, redundancy of 
multi-component systems, changing the design scheme, dampers, vibration dampers, arrestors of crack 
growth, etc.), and (3) recovering to the states «as before the accident», «as new», or «much better than 
new», depending on the plan for using the system in the future and the degree of anti-fragility of the 
creative DMs who own and / or manage the infrastructure in question. Thus, the system resilience is 
determined by its ability: (1) to resist mechanical forces, kinematic and degradation effects (the local 
failure initiating accident is characterized by an insignificant level of damage to the system); (2) to 
absorb the impact of the initial damage and minimize the cascading/chain failure length and its 
consequences. This quality is called robustness; and (3) to recover (quickly and efficiently regenerate 
all its design functional properties). 
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Strictly speaking, the ability to recover  should not be considered an attribute of the infrastructure 
per se (although it is accepted in practically all publications on systems resilience), since restoration of 
the damaged or destroyed infrastructure is carried out by another (construction) infrastructure, while a 
third (financial) infrastructure serves as a source of funds for restoration. The ability to recover should 
be obviously attributed to the construction and financial branches of an enterprise that is the owner of 
the damaged infrastructure, or mainly to the construction entity that performed the task of recovery, if 
it was outsourced. It is also a function of the asset management ingenuity and quality, and of regional 
governance specifics. Hence, system resilience  ΣRes   consists of two parts. One of them (Resstr) is the 
resilience of the physical system per se, the other, Resrec, is the resilience of another infrastructure, 
namely the one that conducts or governs the recovery of the damaged system:   
 Σ str recRes = Res  + Res . (1) 
Likewise, the psychological supra-resilience also does not belong to the damaged system, because 
this restoration is conducted by a fourth, medical infrastructure, although in many cases it is embedded 
as a matryoshka (nested doll) in the system being recovered. 
5.  Supra-resilience of urban critical infrastructures   
As an intrinsic property of any socio-technological system that explicitly includes human society 
which consists of humans that are capable to adapt and make decisions based on to some extent free 
choice as its integral part, supraresilience can serve as the basis and tool for solving the most urgent 
issues of modern civilization. In order to describe antifragility from a mathematical point of view as a 
logical extension of something that we already know how to describe (this is the most often used 
mathematical technique in such cases) we can write that antifragility, conditioned on stressor Q 
 Antifragility(Q) = Resilience(Q) + Overcompensation(Q),  (2) 
or, fully equivalent 
 Supraresilience(Q) = Resilience(Q) + Overshooting(Q),  (3) 
Where overcompensation (overshooting) is the ability of the system to improve its initial quality 
parameters (whatever they may be) after being exposed to specific stressors Q (on the condition that 
they do not exceed some usually unknown ultimate limits. If they do, it injures/breaks the system). 
It is also possible to define antifragility and supraresilience as only overcompensation / 
overshooting. 
If we agree on this definition, then the definition of urban supra-resilience antifragility using the 
above European Commission description of resilience formulates as  
Urban supraresilience (antifragility) is «the ability of an urban/regional system of systems of 
critical infrastructures  to withstand, adapt, quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as drought, 
violence, conflict, natural, technological or man-made disaster, and at the same time improve/increase 
its initial vitality parameters.  
It is interesting to note that in China, the only country on the world stage that survived for more 
than 5000 years without interruption, since ancient times exists a famous adage, which is used as a 
curse, not as a benign wish to one’s antagonist: 愿你生活在变革的时代 (Yuàn nǐ shēnghuó zài 
biàngé de shídài). The English translation sounds as: May you live in the times of change. It seems that 
the Chinese society never cared much about the hidden antifragility of change and aimed at Confucius 
style Ordnung.   
The antifragility phenomenon is unique for each person, and for that matter, community, or society, 
as it largely depends on one’s genes or a pool of genes. Moreover, it is a random function/field of the 
person’s age, level of physical and mental health, and the type, level and duration of the stressor 
imposed on her/him. Hence, for each type of stressor each person reacts by one’s own antifragility 
feedback (overshoot). In order to effectively utilize one’s antifragility it is necessary to know her/his 
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boundary between the benign and the unhealthy levels of the stressor at any given time, which is a 
daunting, impossible task. There are no recipes for estimating these boundaries. Mankind does not 
know how to reconcile human ambitions and human possibilities, and there are no methods other than 
debilitating to test the strength of people. This statement seems to be true when testing the physical 
and mental abilities and the creative power of people, the latter being even more difficult, as it also 
depends on the level of one’s education and cultural upbringing. This leaves us with pure empirics 
when trying to assess the combined (integral) antifragility of an urban society working as a team to 
create an supraresilient smart city while operating, using and maintaining a system of systems of 
critical interdependent infrastructures.  
The supraresilience is achieved only if there is some extra resource or a genuinely new design for 
the damaged system that permits overshooting, thereby creating a system more resilient than before 
the event. This is a manifest of the HF supra-resilience (creative persons) involved in the project. In 
general, everything of the man-made Nature that survived time  could be considered as antifragility of 
the past generations accumulated and preserved in built structures and passed on to present and future 
generations. 
6.  The source of urban supraresilience 
N. Taleb recommends [2] using the antifragility bell bar method  when trading stock and conducting 
other types of  stock exchange business, that makes the person smart.This is advice that should be 
followed by all urban DMs when they make macro economic decisions involving stock exchange. In 
cases related to engineering practices the regional DMs should follow recommended practices from 
multiple engineering sciences and convergent technologies as related to the areas of their expertise, 
activity and responsibility. For instance, using  structural reliability and resilience methods, they 
should: (1) Simulate different scenarios of catastrophes. Each scenario produces its own results (loss 
of production, decrease of RDP, number of injuries, fatalities etc.) of the catastrophe and the resources 
and time needed to bring the system back to the state «as new», or «as before the catastrophe»; (2) 
Optimize predictive maintenance using  the two-or three-level policy method created for optimizing 
mechanical systems [21]. 
The ultimate difference between the problems solved by the considered methods is in that  in the 
sphere of  engineering the losses due to a catastrophe never will be as large as in the stock exchange 
practice. Engineering practice has a sophisticated system of checks and balances in the form of safety 
design codes and regulations developed over the last 50+ years. The stock exchange business, for 
obvious reasons, still lacks such tools or methods of their effective  implementation.  
 In order to fully understand the concept of urban antifragility demonstrated as supraresilience, it is 
necessary to consider the urban system of systems (SoS) of physical critical interdependent 
infrastructures that includes the human community as a separate social infrastructure in itself, that runs 
and uses the production/services of the SoS, and, simultaneously, lives in the space of these 
infrastructures (the urbs and the civitas [3]). When solving this problem, one must consider the 
interconnection of the Mother-Nature with the second, man-made Nature in an urban environment, 
looking through an supra-resilient lens that is in the hands of the smart community that runs the show 
in a city.  
In the context of the main theme of the paper (BSC and antifragility) and taking into account its 
limited size, the remaining space of the paper is spent to describing in highly condensed form 
following aspects of urban/regional supraresilience: (1) resilience metrics; (2) methods for assessing 
the volume of damage caused by a specific set of stresses; (3) analysis of  interdependence of critical 
infrastructures; (4) convergent technologies/science needed for conducting research on regional 
resilience.   
SPCECI 2019










7.  Resilience metrics 
To quantify resilience it is necessary to introduce some transparent, meaningful and simple metrics, 
easy to calculate and use for all of its components. These metrics can be given in absolute and relative 
values.  
In structural mechanics and reliability design there are just a few quantitative metrics for resilience. 
Most of them were developed for using in design and are simply ratios of some crucial informative 
parameters of the design vs same parameters of a reference baseline.  They are hard to use, because 
some of the parameters have to be known at a very early stage of design, before there is any possibility 
to assess them.  
In [22] structural resilience was described as reliability of a performing structure when loaded by 
stressors beyond their design values. At the very moment the load on the system exceeds its design 
value, the structural resilience of the system is equal to its structural reliability and  the reliability 
curve seamlessly transforms into resilience curve. Actually, resilience is described as reliability of a 
structure, when it is exposed to stresses caused by loads that are above their design values.   
Resilience analysis proposed in [23,24] for systems allows assessing physical and relative 
consequences of the collapse of the quality of functioning of the ICI due to an accident or catastrophe 
It should be scaled on at least such parameters as: (1) decrease of the volume of goods and services 
produced by ICI, (2) losses of real regional domestic product RDP, (3) number of lost life-days, 
injuries, limbs and fatalities (irreversible losses). It demonstrates changes in partial resiliencies and the 
extent of damage of the infrastructure over time for different probabilities of an incident / accident / 
catastrophe.  
The specificity of calculus of the partial resiliencies is in that while reliability, structural resilience 
and safety belong to one class of problems, the physical restoration resilience is an entirely new 
problem, which belongs mainly to governance, operation research and logistics. The latter problem is 
characterized by the time to recovery and its cost. The author proposes using as a resilience parameter 
for the recovery phase the ratio of the products 
 ($recTrec) / ($conTcon),  (4) 
where ($recTrec) is the product of the actual amount of money and time spent on the recovery of the 
damaged system; ($conTcon) is the same, for the same object, but during its  construction. 
The connection of these two groups of usually independent problems is in that solutions of the first 
group of problems provide the input to the second group of problems, which is a perfect example of 
how the infranetics' methodology works (more on this below).  
In this paper, following [23,24], resilience is conveniently represented as a dimensionless random 
variable or function of time, as the ratio of the current resilience to the resilience embedded in the 
system during its design and realized during its construction and commissioning. Such a dimensionless 
relative resilience function (variable), by definition, cannot be greater than unity. 
When repeating the accident-recovery cycle, the base resilience may already be different from that 
in the first cycle. Note that for each type of impact or combination thereof, it is necessary to perform a 
separate assessment of the system resilience with respect to the specific stressor. Only if the system 
receives (from its supra-resilience/antifragility component) the supraresilience property during its 
renovation/repair/recovery can it exceed unity. It can turn out to be an emergent property of the system 
only if the human factor (HF) is explicitly introduced into its composition, namely, those DMs who 
decide which recovery strategy to choose, to what level of productivity / efficiency and by what 
(calendar) time to bring back the damaged infrastructure, based on the regional needs and specifics of 
its governance.  
The calculation of resilience as a regenerative ability of a system requires stochastic modeling of 
emergency response and the process of restoring damaged infrastructure. Here, the baseline is 
resilience, calculated using «standard» rules and techniques, allowing to put the system into operation 
at the pre-set time. 
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All the above reasoning was carried out regarding the generalized productivity of the system. 
Exactly the same reasoning can be carried out for other types of partial resilience, such as: throughput, 
volume and speed of providing various services, percentage of population covered by a specific 
service, number of critical facilities available for use (e.g., housing, grocery stores, medical, 
educational, cultural, etc. institutions), providing opportunities for private and individual economic 
activity, etc. A set of partial resiliencies that covers all vital aspects of life of a regional society is 
considered as full. 
For calibrating the algorithm that models the object recovery process, statistics on past accidents 
and recoveries should be used, whenever and wherever possible. This results in more accurate partial 
resilience curves of real damaged objects. 
8.  Methods for assessing the volume of damage caused to an infrastructure  by a specific set of 
stressors  
A quantitative assessment of system resilience due to its ability to adapt consists in assessing the 
degree and nature of the destruction of the whole system by a fixed value of overload. This is done by 
constructing the so-called fragility/sensibility curves FCs [25], which link the magnitude of the impact 
on the system with the magnitude of its consequential damage in a probabilistic sense the generalized 
probabilistic risk assessment (GPRA) methodology can be effectively used for the evaluation of 
critical infrastructure performance risk. This approach started in the late 1970s as related to nuclear 
power plants and earthquakes, and are now used worldwide in order to assess safety of different 
existing or projected civil structures and power plants subjected to strong ground motions. It should be 
emphasized that there are no limitations to use this approach for other type of stressors and other types 
of infrastructures having in mind the possibility of a black swan event. 
Fragility curves express the conditional probability of failure (CPoF) of a specific infrastructure or 
its component for a given specific stressor size (wind, wave, snow load, earthquake motion, etc). The 
bearing capacity  of the structure  is presumed to be known, via gathering statistical data or conducting 
computer simulation. Currently it usually is modeled by a Log-Normal distribution [18], but it could 
be also modeled by a Weibull PDF.  
The key components of a GPRA study are (1) stressor hazard analysis, (1) fragility evaluation for 
each component and substructure and, (1) system analysis and construction of logical fault tree model. 
In their entirety, these three elements allow for the proper risk quantification of the installation 
(evaluation of the PoF due to the full set of possible accident scenarios). A hazard analysis yields a 
family of curves, each corresponding to a confidence level and thus accounting for uncertainty in the 
estimation of the specific hazard. This PoF can be expressed by convoluting the hazard curve with the 
fragility curve. The PoF conditioned on stressor level parameter b is given by the cumulative 
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where Φ(·) is the standard Gaussian CDF. Hence, the FC is entirely defined by median capacity Bm 
and logarithmic standard deviation β.  
The upgraded version of this formula accounts for two types of uncertainties by incorporating two 
random variables εU and εR with median equal to one and respective log-standard deviations βU and βR 
(βU characterizes uncertainty in the knowledge of the median value whereas βR refers to inherent 
(epistemic) randomness about the median). In this context, random bearing capacity is expressed as 
[25]:  
 ( ) ,m U RB B= ε ε  (6)  
and the CPoF as:
  
SPCECI 2019











1log( / ) Ф ( )( ) Ф ,m uf b
R
b B QP b





where Q = the level of confidence that the CPoF f b f bP P′ < . Equation (6) defines a family of curves, 
each corresponding to a confidence level Q. 
Considering the safety of an infrastructure composed of substructures and equipments (e.g., a 
petrochemical or power plant), the PoF of the entire system is determined by means of fault trees using 
simple logical structures of AND and OR in order to combine different events likely to result in global 
failure. 
9.  Analysis of  interdependence of critical infrastructures 
Interdependency is the main hot-spot issue when considering performance of urban critical 
infrastructures. Currently, there are following possible practical approaches to quantify this 
interdependence: 1) Analysis of the interaction of CIs in the form of transport networks (see Fig. 3); 2) 
Study of the interaction and interdependence of CIs using multiple regression theory; 3) Computer 
simulation of interdependence involving stakeholders (including building a digital twin/ close relative 
of the objects under study) based on the HAZUR-БИЖУР software [26]. 
The analytical models fit for this kind of research should allow finding in a comparatively simple 
way and without big errors numerical values of all types of damage and how they change in time. One 
of the most versatile models here would be the advanced transportation network model [27]. 
This practical synthetic model describes functioning of interdependent systems of critical 
infrastructures (ISCI), each of which is represented in the form of a transportation/services network 
comprised of nodes and directed links. Nodes typically represent physical infrastructure components 
(the so-called assets, such as electrical power producing plants, oil, gas and water processing units and 
installations, hospitals, industrial and office buildings, research and education centers, living quarters 
and the like), which are directly involved in supplying the population and local industries with 
different products or commodities, and services. The links of the network are modelling the flow 
(product transportation) between the nodes and may present electrical power grids, main and 
distribution gas and oil pipelines; water supply and sewage systems, as well as railways and highways, 
etc. The model considers the conditions and specifics of supply, delivery, overhaul, and demand of 




Figure 3. Visualization of interdependence 
of two CIs.  
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The specificity of solving such problems is in finding the critical points or thresholds when there 
appear changes in the normal (design) performance of interacting CIs (see Fig. 3). State (0–1) 
represents normal operation/performance of both CIs. State (1–2) is a state when the performance of 
both CIs is still normal, but the reserve of CI #/I capacity is severely depleted. State (2–3) means that 
any remaining reserve of the CI# I is gone and, hence, the consumption of CI #J is compromised. State 
(3–4) represents the case when the energy output of CI#I is zero, or close to zero, and the operation of 
the whole CI# I is brought down. The generic equation that describes the above situations has the 
form:  
 ( ) ( ) [ ]1 2  0  ; 1 2  0i i NQ , , , ,... i , ,...M , TΕ τ − τ ≥ ∆ ∆ = ∆ ∆ ∆ = ≤ τ ≤∑ ∑  (8) 
where iΕ∑  is the energy output of the CI #I, iQ∑  is the energy consumption of the CI# I output, N 
is the number of performance change triggers, M is the number of nodes in the CI#I network, T is the 
total duration of joint performance of considered ICIs. 
The second approach (multiple regression) is theoretically attractive but very hard to implement, 
since it needs a lot of reliable data gathered from real life cases. This data can be provided by the third 
approach, but once it is realized, there is no need for the second approach per se; it could be used for 
visualizing the results obtained by simulation. The main problem of implementing the third approach 
is in how to quantify the interdependence of the multitude of critical infrastructures that perform in or 
out of sync. 
10.  Designing the regional risk management /governance strategy using infranetics concepts   
In order to create an optimal strategy of regional risk management a special tool is needed that would 
allow using multi- and inter disciplinary approach and various methods from different fundamental, 
applied and engineering sciences under one umbrella [29].  For this matter in this paper the new 
convergent science- Infranetics- based on the MAICS-convergent technology (Digital Stochastic 
Mechanics, Artificial Intelligence, Information Theory, Cognitive and Social Sciences) is used. The 
name Infranetics comes from Infrastructures+Cybernetics. Infranetics was constructed for solving the 
central problem of safe innovative development of a region/territory/municipality by creating a 
methodology of harmonized regulation of regional risk, based on optimal management of systems of 
interdependent critical infrastructures (ICI). A full description of the method can be found in [28,29]. 
In Fig. 4 the flow chart of constructing such strategy using the infranetics philosophy and tools is 
presented.  
It can be seen that creation of such strategy involves a heterogeneous set of initial data and 
knowledge from multiple fundamental, applied, and engineering sciences. When solving this problem 
for some regions of the Russian Federation, the author came across several surprise info-gaps (most of 
them known unknowns) in macro-economics [30], demography [31], reliability theory of large 
systems [32], to name a few, which needed immediate attention, as they were roadblocks preventing 
reaching the assigned goal. It seems that in this case infranetics concept threw new insight into the 
research problem; advanced research in several fundamental and applied disciplines; greatly enhanced 
and expedited the research.   
Accumulating results of this kind of interdisciplinary research permits understanding what methods 
from what disciplines belong to infranetics. The results, obtained by the above scheme, made it 
possible to effectively manage the SICI in different types of municipalities and territories (see [33–
37]). 
Infranetics manifests itself as a cross-pollinating complex-sciences discipline. It permits accurate-
enough prognosis of the behavior of complex socio-technological and economic systems being 
designed or already performing, in usual and/or catastrophic situations. Infranetics uses goal-oriented 
approach according which a unified concept is formed that describes ways and means for solving the 
problem in consideration. If properly developed, infranetics could become the crucial convergent 
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Figure 4. Regional governance strategy via regional resilience and risk 
management using infranetics principles and tools. 
11.  Conclusion 
The resilience property is the ability of an infrastructure system to continue to perform its design 
functions in conditions when it is partially damaged and/or deprived of supplies, and with employees 
and population psychologically stressed. This circumstance is the unconditional and the sole basis for 
creating a reliable and safe smart territory. The concepts of acceptable risks developed for managing 
the technological, industrial and natural risks are quite compatible with BSEph.  
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Without resilience, it is impossible to create a smart region/city capable of sustainable 
development. Resilience is also necessary for achieving the long-term goals of strategic development 
of any region, which include developing human capital, improving the quality of life and increasing 
the competitiveness of the economy through the systematic introduction of services and innovative 
solutions. 
Supra-resilience/antifragility should be a property of every socio-technical system, but  it is not a 
given. All physical infrastructures are fragile, by definition. But if coupled with a supra-resilient 
component (i.e., high quality human factor) the socio-technical system can obtain needed antifragility 
traits.  
For a socio-technical systems to be antifragile, its supra-resilient  components should take care of 
all the system's fragile components.  The supraresilient  components in their term have to care of each 
other, using for that all methods that mankind developed to this day, including the «skin in the game» 
concept [38]. A structure can be designed to last (i.e., possess physical and moral longevity), be 
adaptable and accommodate new functions through intelligent design, construction, optimal 
maintenance and effective governance by the cognitive and creative components of the region/city that 
can face the unpredictable events.  
The concept of supraresilience opens the door to meaningful exploration of quantitative 
dependencies/correlations between physical resilience of a system of systems of ICIs and the 
psychological/societal resilience of people who live inside and extensively use this system of ICIs in 
the context of different types of communities – from megacities, to big, medium size and small towns, 
to villages/settlements and tribal areas.  
The effectiveness of the interaction of ICIs cannot be adequately described without direct 
consideration of the human factor (HF). Which profile specialists are best to pull off and solve this 
task? This question is open for discussion, but it seems that civil and environmental engineers, 
structural mechanics specialists and designers are best fit to take lead when tackling this problem. 
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